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The Enron debacle in the US, which led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“SOX”)1 in the US, inﬂuenced far reaching changes in regulations governing
auditor independence and audit committee across the world. In India, the
economic reforms which began in 1991 have put great emphasis on the role of
the external auditor and the audit committee. The “Clause 49” regulations2
which were made part of the Listing Agreement by the Securities Exchange
Board of India (SEBI) in 2001 required every listed company to have an
audit committee and speciﬁed its composition, role, and power in detail. The
Naresh Chandra Committee (“NCC”)3 that was constituted in August 2002
produced an exhaustive report on the auditor-company relationship and the
functioning of the audit committee. Many of these recommendations have
been incorporated in the Companies Bill, 20094 which is currently waiting
for legislative approval.
Theory and the empirical literature overwhelmingly suggest that auditor and
audit committee independence plays an important role in the governance of
companies. The recommendations of the NCC have set standards which
are line with international best practices. The Companies Bill, 2009
has incorporated many of these recommendations. For investors to have
conﬁdence in the independence of the auditor, the Companies Bill, 2009
needs to be enacted quickly into law. At the same time, there are many
areas for improvement in the Companies Bill of 2009. The paper reviews the
regulations and the suggested governance reforms in India with respect to
auditor and audit committee independence.
On the issue of auditor independence, the paper discusses three key aspects
which regulations try to address, namely (a) disqualiﬁcation for audit
assignments that arise due to potential conﬂicts of interest from employment,
ﬁnancial interest, and other relationships between the auditing ﬁrm and the
audit client, (b) types of non-audit services rendered by the auditing ﬁrm,
and (c) audit partner rotation.
On the issue of disqualiﬁcation for audit assignments the NCC recommended
that an audit ﬁrm will be disqualiﬁed from being appointed as the statutory
1Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, http://www.law.uc.edu/ccl/soact/toc.htm
2SEBI, Clause 49 Regulations, Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2004/12/10
October 29, 2004. http://www.sebi.gov.in
3Naresh Chandra Committee Report on Corporate Audit and Governance (2002)
4The Companies Bill, 2009, http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/pdf/
Companies_Bill_2009_24Aug2009.pdf
3external auditor if the audit ﬁrm, its partners or members of the engagement
team as well as their ‘direct relatives’ had any (i) ﬁnancial interest in the
audit client, (ii) received any loans and guarantees from the audit client (iii)
had any business relationship with the audit client and (iv) had any personal
relationships with the key oﬃcers of the audit client. In addition, the NCC
also recommended (v) a cooling period of two years before any partner or
member of the auditing ﬁrm can join the audit client, or any key oﬃcer of
the audit client can join the auditing ﬁrm, and (vi) prohibition on undue
dependence on an audit client in terms of audit fees.
The Companies Bill, 2009 incorporated the ﬁrst four recommendations of
the NCC report, but the recommendations regarding undue dependence and,
more strikingly, the recommendation regarding the cooling period were not
incorporated in the Companies Bill, 2009. The latter recommendation comes
from the basic concern that a member of the audit engagement team who
has only recently been a key oﬃcer of the audit client poses signiﬁcant “self-
review” threat as these persons will be less inclined to detect errors that they
themselves may have committed in their capacity of a key oﬃcer of the audit
client. Simultaneously, a key oﬃcer of the audit client who has only recently
been a member of the auditing ﬁrm can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the auditors
incentive, ability, and inclination to detect potential accounting and ﬁnancial
errors by the audit client.
With respect to prohibited non-audit services the NCC recommended nine
types of services that an audit ﬁrm was prohibited from rendering to its
audit client. The list of services mimic the list of services prohibited by
the SEC except for legal services and expert services which are prohibited
by the SEC but not recommended by the NCC. The Companies Bill, 2009
incorporated the ﬁrst seven recommendations of the NCC5 but did not
include the recommendations relating to (i) any form of staﬀ recruitment,
and particularly hiring of senior management staﬀ for the audit client and
(ii) valuation services and fairness opinion in the list of prohibited services.
On the issue of compulsory audit partner rotation the NCC recommended
that all partners and at least half of the audit engagement team (excluding
article clerks) be rotated after ﬁve years. The recommendation also provided
for a cooling period of ﬁve years before rotated members can join the audit
engagement team for the particular audit client. The NCC recommendations
regarding auditor rotation are very similar to those speciﬁed under SOX
regulations, but these have not been adopted in the Companies Bill, 2009.
5The Companies Bill, 2009 broke up the investment adviser or investment banking
services separately into investment adviser services and investment banking services.
4Mandatory rotation exists for government ﬁrms but not for private listed
companies.
The paper also looks at the size, composition, independence, and powers
and functions of the audit committee, which plays a vital role ensuring
the independence of the audit process. In doing so it makes a comparative
assessment of such regulations in other countries.
While a signiﬁcant number of proactive regulations have been enacted in
India since the 1990s, there are two aspects which require further attention:
the composition of the audit committee and its authority to implement its
decisions. A review of the sequence of regulations shows that there has been
as t e a d yd i l u t i o no ft h ei n d e p e n d e n c er e q u i r e m e n tw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ea u d i t
committee. The original Clause 49 regulations required the audit committee
to have a minimum size of three and to be constituted entirely of non-
executive directors with majority of them being independent.6
The revised Clause 497 removed the non-executive director requirement and
instead speciﬁed that the audit committee have a minimum of three members
with two-thirds of them being independent. The Companies Bill, 2009 follows
the revised Clause 49 regulations by not insisting that the audit committee
comprise only of non executive directors but reverts to the majority rule
rather than having a two-thirds rule.8 Given the minimum size of three a
reversion to the one-thirds rule as opposed to the majority rule does not
impose any extra constraint. The NCC in its report, while applauding the
existing Clause 49 regulations on the audit committee, pointed out that one
area that needed improvement and tightening was the composition of the
audit committee and recommended that if the audit committee is perceived
to be independent, then it should consist only of independent directors.
Unfortunately this has not been incorporated in the Companies Bill, 2009.
The weaker independence requirement regarding the composition of the audit
committee has to be seen in context of the fact that the audit committees
recommendations relating to hiring, oversight, compensation, and ﬁring of
the outside auditor are not binding on the Board, in contrast to the regulation
in the US where under the SOX Act of 2002, the audit committee is “directly
6SEBI, Clause 49 Regulations, Circular No. SMDRP/POLICY/CIR-10/2000, dated
February 21, 2000. http://www.sebi.gov.in
7SEBI, Clause 49 Regulations, Circular No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2004/12/10
October 29, 2004. http://www.sebi.gov.in
8Section 158 (2) of the Companies Bill, 2009 speciﬁes that “The Audit Committee shall
consist of a minimum of three directors with independent directors forming a majority and
at least one director having knowledge of ﬁnancial management, audit or accounts.”
5responsible for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight” of
the statutory auditor and each such statutory auditor “must report directly
to the audit committee.”
After the Companies Bill, 2009 is enacted as law, two areas of work pending
with policy makers are: the issue of independence of the audit committee
both in terms of its composition and the power of the Board to overrule
its decisions, and the issue related to conﬂict-of-interest in auditor-company
relationship and audit partner rotation. These issues have to be addressed
in future regulation to make auditing and oversight standards in India
comparable to those in the more mature economies. If it is operationally
diﬃcult to obtain amendments of law in the near future, then SEBI and
the Stock Exchanges need to explore the possibility of incorporating these
additional standards of independence in the Listing Agreement. Since the
provisions of the Companies Bill, 2009 can be interpreted as only laying
down minimum standards, nothing prevents stock exchanges from insisting
on higher standards of independence from companies listed under their
supervision.
This paper is structured, starting with a review of the regulations and
governance reforms on auditor independence (Section 2) and audit committee
independence (Section 3) of Indian ﬁrms, comparing them with the
regulations existing in the US. This is followed by a discussion of the existing
research on the eﬀectiveness of audit committees and audit independence
in corporate governance in Section 4. Section 5 present recent trends in
audit committee and auditor characteristics for a sample of the large listed
companies in the Indian corporate sector. The paper concludes by suggesting
some governance reforms that may be considered to further strengthen
auditor independence and the functioning of audit committees in India in
Section 6.
2 Auditor independence
Auditors are the lead actors in the auditing process and provide independent
oversight to the ﬁnancial reporting by companies. Modern day corporations
are huge and their operations are complex. While accounting standards and
norms are speciﬁed by the regulators for proper disclosure. Yet preparation
of proper ﬁnancial reports requires an evaluation of the judgements and
assumptions made by the management, along with their justiﬁcation of the
ﬁnal choice among several alternative accounting principles. Consistency
6of applications in preparing accounts and coverage of all relevant ﬁnancial
aspects are required.
Auditors scrutinize and verify the accounts, as well as certify that the
ﬁnancial statements are prepared in accordance to the prescribed principles
and that the accounts are free from material misstatements. It is therefore
expected for the law in all countries to have put enormous responsibility on
the auditors to ensure that the accounts give a true and fair view of the
operations of the company. In the US, the SOX Act has put great emphasis
on auditor independence. Following the Act, the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)9 has made speciﬁc rules to put the provisions of the Act
into operation. At home in India, a similar eﬀort has been made by the NCC,
which has given a series of recommendations that have been incorporated in
the Companies Bill (2009) and are awaiting parliamentary approval.
The rules and regulations regarding auditors independence framed by
regulators are predicated on some fundamental principles. The NCC
lists two fundamental principles behind auditor’s independence namely,
(i) independence of mind -w h i c hp e r m i t sa r r i v i n ga ta ni n f o r m e da n d
reasoned opinion without being aﬀected by factors that compromise integrity,
professional scepticism and objectivity of judgement and (ii) independence
in appearance -w h i c hr e q u i r e sa v o i d i n gf a c t s ,c i r c u m s t a n c e sa n di n s t a n c e s
where, an informed third party could reasonably conclude that integrity,
objectivity and professionalism has, or may have, been compromised (NCC,
2004; pp 36). As the NCC rightly points out “for the public to have
conﬁdence in the quality of audit, it is essential that auditors should always
be - and be seen to be - independent of the companies that they are auditing.”
Thus, when situations of potential conﬂicts arise, the law in general has taken
as c e p t i c a lv i e wa n de r r e do nt h es i d eo fc a u t i o nb yp u t t i n gt h ei n t e r e s to f
the general public before the interest of the auditor.
Similar principles are enshrined in the Code of Ethics for Professional
Accountants, prescribed by the International Federation of Accountants
(IFAC) which identiﬁes ﬁve types of potential threats to auditor’s
independence:
• Self-interest threats, which occur when an auditing ﬁrm, its partner or
associate could beneﬁt from a ﬁnancial interest in an audit client.
• Self-review threats,w h i c ho c c u rw h e nd u r i n gar e v i e wo fa n yj u d g e m e n t
or conclusion reached in a previous audit or non-audit engagement, or
9Sarbanes-Oxley Rule making and Reports, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
sarbanes-oxley.htm
7when a member of the audit team was previously a director or senior
employee of the client.
• Advocacy threats,w h i c ho c c u rw h e nt h ea u d i t o rp r o m o t e s ,o ri s
perceived to promote, a client’s opinion to a point where people may
believe that objectivity is getting compromised.
• Familiarity threats are self-evident, and occur when auditors form
relationships with the client where they end up being too sympathetic
to the client’s interests.
• Intimidation threats, which occur when auditors are deterred from
acting objectively with an adequate degree of professional scepticism
because of threat of replacement.
Building on these ﬁve fundamental principles, both the NCC and the SOX
Act have put in place a number of regulations/recommendations regarding
the qualiﬁcation of auditors for engaging in statutory audit, the type of non-
audit services that they can render, the need for rotating members of the
audit engagement team, and restrictions on the extent of non-audit fees that
an auditing ﬁrm can get from an audit engagement. The single purpose of
these eﬀorts has been to ensure auditor’s independence.
2.1 Key aspects of auditor independence
The three key aspects of auditor’s independence which all regulations try to
address are:
1. Ap o t e n t i a lc o n ﬂ i c t so fi n t e r e s tt h a ta r i s ef r o me m p l o y m e n t ,ﬁ n a n c i a l
interest, and other relationships between the auditing ﬁrm and the
audit client,
2. Types of non-audit services rendered by the auditing ﬁrm, and
3. Audit partner rotation.
The NCC has deliberated extensively on these three aspects and come up
with recommendations which are in line with the international best practices
and which closely follow the provisions under the SOX Act.
82.1.1 Disqualiﬁcation for audit assignments
Conﬂict of interest is one primary concern of the regulators for ensuring
auditor’s independence. The NCC recommended that an auditing ﬁrm will
be disqualiﬁed from being appointed as the statutory external auditor if
the audit ﬁrm, its partners or members of the engagement team as well as
their ’direct relatives’ had any (i) ﬁnancial interest in the audit client, (ii)
received any loans and guarantees from the audit client (iii) had any business
relationship with the audit client and (iv) had any personal relationships with
the key oﬃcers of the audit client, i.e. any whole time director, CEO, CFO,
Company Secretary, senior management belonging to the top two managerial
levels and the oﬃcer who is in default.
In addition, the NCC also recommended (v) to have a cooling period of two
years before any partner or member of the auditing ﬁrm can join the audit
client, or any key oﬃcer of the audit client can join the auditing ﬁrm, and
(vi) prohibition on undue dependence where under which a audit ﬁrm was
disqualiﬁed from auditing if the fees from any single audit client exceeded
25 percent of the total revenues of the audit ﬁrm. The recommendations
were tight that in that it included all the aﬃliates and the subsidiaries
of the both the audit client and the audit ﬁrm in the determination of
independence. Section 124 of the Companies Bill (2009) incorporated the ﬁrst
four recommendations of the NCC report. The recommendations regarding
undue dependence and, more strikingly, the recommendation regarding the
cooling period were not incorporated in the Companies Bill (2009).
The recommendation regarding undue dependence had attracted some
debate as this may aﬀect the survival of the small ﬁrms. The NCC has been
sympathetic to this argument and had speciﬁed that its recommendation
with respect to undue dependence were not applicable to audit ﬁrms for the
ﬁrst ﬁve years from the date of commencement of their activities, and for
ﬁrms whose total annual revenues were less than Rs.15 lakhs per year. The
principle of “intimidation threat” which is likely to operate on the audit ﬁrm
when it is reliant on a few clients for its survival may have prompted the
committee to make this recommendation. Equally arguable, of course, is the
reverse viewpoint that if regulatory action for wrong doing is credible, then
the audit ﬁrm is likely to work even more diligently when it has only a few
clients. Coupled with this, the audit committee which is envisaged to play a
critical role in ensuring that the external auditor is protected from the pulls
and pressures of the management may have prompted the Companies Bill
(2009) to not include this recommendation for enactment. Similar regulation
9on undue dependence, however, does not exist in the SOX Act.
The more striking omission from the Companies Bill (2009) is the NCC
recommendation of providing a cooling oﬀ period before a member of the
audit engagement team can join the audit client or a key oﬃcer of the
audit client can join the audit ﬁrm. This recommendation comes from
the basic concern that a member of the audit engagement team who has
only recently been a key oﬃcer of the audit client poses signiﬁcant “self-
review” threat as these persons will be less inclined to detect errors that
they themselves may have committed in their capacity of a key oﬃcer of
the audit client. Simultaneously, a key oﬃcer of the audit client who has
only recently been a member of the auditing ﬁrm can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the auditor’s incentive, ability, and inclination to detect potential accounting
and ﬁnancial errors by the audit client. The recommendation views passage
of time to be essential in reducing the possibility of inﬂuencing the policies
of the accounting ﬁrm and the resultant perceived loss of independence.
The provision of the cooling period is one of the major concerns under
the SOX Act. Section 206 of the SOX Act speciﬁes that an accounting
ﬁrm cannot perform an audit of a company “(i)f a chief executive oﬃcer,
controller, chief ﬁnancial oﬃcer, chief accounting oﬃcer, or any person
serving in an equivalent position for the issuer, was employed by that
registered independent public accounting ﬁrm and participated in any
capacity in the audit of that issuer during the 1-year period preceding the
date of the initiation of the audit10”. The SEC while framing its rule
on “Conﬂicts of Interest Resulting from Employment Relationships” for
implementing these provisions of the SOX Act expanded the coverage of
the cooling oﬀ period from the four speciﬁed key oﬃcers named in the Act
to any person in a “ﬁnancial reporting oversight role.” However, recognizing
the over-reaching nature of the laws, it narrowed down the application of the
cooling period to only the lead partner, concurring partner, and any other
member of the audit engagement team body who provided ten or more hours
of audit,review and attestation services (SEC Rule 208-2).
There are some notable diﬀerences between the SEC rule and the
recommendations of the NCC.
1. Under the NCC recommendations, the cooling oﬀ period applies to not
only the audit partners but to all members of the audit engagement
team. In contrast the SEC rules are applicable to the lead partner,
concurring partner, and to only those members rendering ten or more
10http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm
10hours of audit services, the assumption being that some minimum
amount of participation is required for a member to have signiﬁcant
interaction with the management during the audit process.
2. Under the NCC recommendation, the cooling oﬀ period is applicable
irrespective of the employment position which the former audit ﬁrm
member takes up in the audit client and not restricted to positions
with ﬁnancial reporting and oversight role as it is under the SEC rules.
3. The NCC recommendations apply not only to members of the audit
ﬁrm taking up positions in the audit client, but also to employees of
the audit client taking up positions in the audit ﬁrm.
4. Finally, the cooling oﬀ period under the NCC is two years while it is
one year under the SEC rule.
Perhaps the ﬁrst two recommendations of the NCC are too broad in their
applicability and can be narrowed down to some extent. The major
criterion in determining the applicability of the law should be the ability
and the incentive of the members of the audit ﬁrm and the audit client
to inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of the audit process. Unlike the SEC, the
NCC recommendations that require the cooling oﬀ period to also apply
to employees of audit client while joining the audit ﬁrm is a well thought
out move that recognize that reverse inﬂuence that former employees of the
audit client can exercise when they are part of the audit engagement team.
However, in this case too, the scope of the recommendation can be made
narrow by making the law applicable only to key oﬃcers of the audit client
joining key positions in the audit ﬁrm. Thus the ideal rule would be one which
provides for a cooling period before the lead, concurring or any signiﬁcant
member of the audit engagement team takes up a ﬁnancial reporting oversight
role in the audit client or a person in a ﬁnancial reporting oversight role in
the audit client becomes a lead, concurring, or a signiﬁcant member of the
audit ﬁrm. The terms “signiﬁcant audit member” could be deﬁned based on
the nature and duration of services by the audit member. The extent of the
cooling period could be left to the decided based on norms and practice in
other countries.
2.1.2 Prohibited non-audit services
Provision of non-audit services is another major concern for the regulator
in ensuring auditor independence as rendering many of these services puts
the independence of the auditor standard at signiﬁcant risk. Auditing ﬁrms
11have incentives to perform non-audit services to augment their income and
because of the informational advantage that they gain during the auditing
process about the ﬁnancial status of the audit client. Accordingly, laws in
various countries list a number of services that an auditing ﬁrm is prohibited
from rendering to its audit clients. The prohibition of non-audit services
comes from the two principles, namely, the self-review threat and advocacy
threat outlined earlier. Similar principles are highlighted by the SEC when it
mentions that “the Commission’s principles of independence with respect to
services provided by auditors are largely predicated on three basic principles,
violations of which would impair the auditor’s independence: (1) an auditor
cannot function in the role of management, (2) an auditor cannot audit his
or her own work, and (3) an auditor cannot serve in an advocacy role for his
or her client.”11
The NCC recommended nine types of services that an audit ﬁrm was
prohibited from rendering to its audit client. The list of services mimic
the list of services prohibited under the SEC except for legal services and
expert services which are prohibited under the SEC but not recommended
by the NCC (Box 1). The SEC puts forward purposeful arguments built on
the principle of “Advocacy Threat” for including these two services in the
prohibited list but the NCC does not cite any reasons for excluding them in its
recommendations. Further under the SEC Rules (208-6) the lead, concurring
and audit partner cannot receive compensation based on selling engagements
other than audit, review and attestation services as rendering these services
can hamper an accountant’s objectivity and shift the focus from audit to
non-audit works. Other members of the audit engagement team however can
receive compensation for rendering non-audit services provided those are not
in the prohibited list are approved by the audit committee. No such rule
exits in the Companies Bill, 2009 nor is recommended by NCC.
Section 127 of the Companies Bill (2009) incorporated the ﬁrst seven
recommendations of the NCC12 but did not include the recommendations
relating to (i) any form of staﬀ recruitment, and particularly hiring of senior
management staﬀ for the audit client and (ii) valuation services and fairness
opinion in the list of prohibited service. Under the SEC both (i) appraisal or
valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports as well as
(ii) human resources services are strictly prohibited. As the SEC recognizes in
its discussion of Rules, that when an auditor actively assists the management
11See Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,
Section II.B http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm
12The Companies Bill (2009) broke up the investment adviser or investment banking
services separately into investment adviser services and investment banking services.
12to recruit, train and evaluate employees for the audit client, especially in
senior management positions, the “accountant would be reluctant to suggest
the possibility that those employees failed to perform their jobs appropriately,
or at least reasonable investors might perceive the accountant to be reluctant,
because doing so would require the accountant to acknowledge shortcomings
in its human resource service.13” With respect to valuation services and
fairness opinions the SOX Act recognizes that undertaking these services
may put the accountant under the self-review threat of having to review his
or her own work as these services often require the auditing ﬁrm to make key
assumptions, projections, and valuations of a company’s assets, cash ﬂow and
other relevant ﬁnancial variables that can become the subject of audit later.
Also while valuation services are fairness opinions that are oﬀered mostly for
judging the suﬃciency of consideration in a ﬁnancial transactions, thsese are
likely to be based on an aggressive assessment of risk assessment as opposed
to the conservative assessment that is expected of auditors when auditing
the companies’ accounts in public interest.
It is apparent that an expanded list of prohibited services is not in the
interest of the auditing ﬁrms. Rendering valuations services, fairness opinion
and human services can provide signiﬁcant opportunities of augmenting the
revenue of audit ﬁrms especially when the fees from audit services is low.
Thus restricting these services can signiﬁcantly hamper the survival of the
audit ﬁrms, especially the smaller ones. Yet the survival of the auditing
ﬁrms has to be balanced against the interest of the public at large to ensure
that the integrity of the auditing process is not jeopardized. If survival is
the reason for not enacting these two provisions into law then it puts the
independence issue into serious question as audit ﬁrms are more likely to
stand by their assessment as doing otherwise put them at risk of losing
these non-audit services. On the other hand if these services account for
insigniﬁcant proportion of revenue of the audit ﬁrms then there is a greater
reason to include them in the prohibited list as doing so does not materially
aﬀect the auditing ﬁrm but increases the public’s conﬁdence in the audit
process.
2.1.3 Compulsory audit partner rotation
Rotation of audit ﬁrms as a means of safeguarding auditor independence
has been a subject of intense debate for many years. Proponents of
13See Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,
Section II.B http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm
13Box 1: Comparing the prohibitions of the NCC and the US SEC
Prohibited non-audit services under the NCC (Recommendation 2.2),
juxtaposed against analogous prohibitions of the US SEC:
NCC SEC
• Accounting and bookkeeping ser-
vices, related to the accounting
records or ﬁnancial statements of the
audit client.
• Bookkeeping or other services
related accounting records or ﬁnancial
statements of the audit client.
• Internal audit services. • Internal audit outsourcing.
• Financial information systems de-
sign and implementation, including
services related to IT systems for
preparing ﬁnancial or management ac-
counts and information ﬂows of a com-
pany.
• Financial information systems de-
sign and implementation.
• Actuarial services. • Actuarial services.
• Broker, dealer, investment adviser or
investment banking services.
• Broker-dealer, investment adviser or
investment banking services.
• Outsourced ﬁnancial services.
• Management functions, including
the provision of temporary staﬀ to
audit clients.
• Management functions.
• Any form of staﬀ recruitment,
and particularly hiring of senior
management staﬀ for the audit client
• Human resources.
• Valuation services and fairness
opinion
• Appraisal or valuation services,




Of the NCC recommendations, the new proposed Companies Bill 2009
omits the last two.
compulsory audit ﬁrm rotation advance two arguments for mandatory audit
ﬁrm rotation namely (i) decline in audit quality and competence and (ii) loss
of independence due to long association (Joe Hoyle, 1978). With respect to
the former, these proponents point to the laxity in standards and the decline
in creativity that occurs when working for an audit client for long period
and argue that mandatory auditor rotation is necessary for a fresh look.
In addition, mandatory rotation is expected to lead to better audit quality
14by increasing competition among audit ﬁrms, reducing the dependence on
as i n g l ec l i e n ta n di n c r e a s i n ga u d i te ﬀ o r ta si n c u m b e n tﬁ r m sa r el i k e l yt o
work harder when they are aware that their work will be shortly reviewed by
another auditor. With respect to the latter, these proponents point to the
signiﬁcant familiarity threat that occurs with long association causing the
auditor to develop friendly ties and to endorse the views of the management.
Opponents of mandatory auditor rotation point out that modern day
corporations that have complex ﬁnancial operations cutting across national
borders demand auditors who are well versed in accounting standards
and auditing rules speciﬁed by the laws and regulations of each country.
Accordingly, opponents argue that mandatory audit ﬁrm rotation can pose
even greater threat to audit quality by resulting in loss of continuity and
reducing audit competence. In addition they point to the increase in training
costs by audit ﬁrms which are eventually likely to be passed to the audit
clients.
Those who do not support mandatory audit ﬁrm rotation do acknowledge
the potential problems that can arise out of long term association of the
auditor with the client. What they disagree with is whether rotating the
audit ﬁrm is the best way to solve the problem given the potential cost
that mandatory rotation involves. Instead they suggest that the improving
the regulatory framework governing the appointment and functioning of the
auditor, enhancing accounting and reporting standards, and making auditors
responsible for their oversight role would be a safer and better way of ensuring
audit independence.
Given the equally persuasive arguments of both sides, regulators in various
countries have tried to strike a balance between the need for a fresh look
with concerns about loss of continuity and decline in audit quality and
competence, by requiring audit partner rotation instead of rotation of the
audit ﬁrm itself. In India, the NCC recommended that all partners and
at least half of the audit engagement team (excluding article clerks) to be
rotated after ﬁve years. The recommendation also provided for a cooling
period of ﬁve years before rotated members can join the audit engagement
team for the particular audit client. In the US, the SEC rules (208-4) require
the lead partner and the concurring partner to rotate after every ﬁve years
and specify a ﬁve-year time out period before they can return to the audit
engagement team. In addition, the rules also deﬁne “audit partners” as
those who played a signiﬁcant part in the auditing process and require them
to rotate after seven years of engagement and subject to a two year time out
period before joining the audit engagement team.
15In the US, rotation rules were very lax, until the enactment of the SOX
Act which made sweeping changes. In India, there are no formal rules
regarding auditor or audit partner rotations and the recommendations of
the NCC represent the ﬁrst attempts to formalize the norms in this respect.
In general, the NCC recommendations regarding auditor rotation are very
similar to those speciﬁed under the SOX regulations, but these have not
been adopted in the Companies Bill, 2009. Mandatory rotation exists for
government ﬁrms but not for private listed companies. This omission leads
urgent rethinking, especially in light of the Satyam failure14 which brought
into focus the importance of having vigilant auditors and audit committees
in corporate governance.
2.2 Powers, responsibility and accountability of
auditors
Given the enormous importance of auditors in ensuring the integrity of the
ﬁnancial reporting process, the law gives adequate powers to the auditors to
help them discharge their functions eﬀectively and the same time requires
that auditors follow prescribed auditing standards and take responsibility of
their actions. Section 126 of the Companies Bill, 2009 gives the auditors the
right to access to all information relevant for the audit from any place in
India.
In the case of a holding company, Section 126 gives the auditors the power to
access the records of all its subsidiaries that it deems necessary for preparing
consolidated accounts. The last provision is particularly important given
the presence of business groups which have listed companies with multiple
subsidiaries and for which proper consolidated accounts are required to judge
the ﬁnancial health of the companies.
The Bill also makes unilateral replacement of the auditor diﬃcult by requiring
a“ S p e c i a lR e s o l u t i o n ”t ob ep a s s e db e f o r ea na u d i t o rc a nb er e m o v e df r o m
oﬃce before the expiry of its term. However, the NCC recommendations
that a “Special Resolution” be passed in the case of a retiring auditor, who
is otherwise qualiﬁed for re-appointment is replaced, has not been included
in the Companies Bill (2009).
In terms of ensuring auditor responsibility, the Companies Bill (2009) requires
the auditors to prepare and sign an Auditor’s Report that has to read to the
14For a detailed examination of the case of Satyam, see (Chakrabarti and Sarkar, 2010;
Chakrabarti et al., 2010).
16shareholders in the “Annual General Meeting” (AGM) with the report being
available for inspection by any shareholder. The audit report must state
whether the auditor obtained all information that were relevant to the audit,
that all internal controls are in place and proper books of accounts have
been kept and that the ﬁnancial statements have prepared in accordance
to the accounting and auditing standards speciﬁed by the National Advisory
Committee on Accounting and Auditing Standards15 and give a true and fair
view of the state of aﬀairs of the company at the end of the ﬁnancial year.
The Bill requires the auditors to point out qualiﬁed opinion, reservation or
adverse remark relating to the maintenance of accounts and in case a qualiﬁed
opinion is passed, the auditor’s report has to state the reasons behind it. The
NCC recommendation that the audit ﬁrm should send a copy of the qualiﬁed
report to the Registrar of Companies (ROC), SEBI and the relevant stock
exchange. This would inform management about the same, has not been
incorporated in the Companies Bill (2009).
2.3 Penalties for violations
It has been often said that even when rules and regulations are adequate,
the penalty levels for contravention of rules are so low that they fail to act
as eﬀective deterrents to their contravention. In the existing Companies Act
of 1956, the penalty on companies and the relevant oﬃcers was rupees ﬁve
hundred, and that on the auditor was rupees one thousand and that too for
only willful default! (Sections 232 and 233)
The Companies Bill (2009) addresses this issue by mandating much stiﬀer
punishment for any violation of the rules governing the audit process. It
provides not only monetary penalties but also imprisonment. Under Section
130 of the Bill, any contravention of the auditing rules by the company
attracts ﬁnes ranging from rupees twenty ﬁve thousand to rupees ﬁve lakhs.
If an oﬃcer is in default, the ﬁnes range between rupees ten thousand to
rupees one lakh and imprisonment up to one year. Penalties for auditor
range between twenty ﬁve thousand to ﬁve lakh and for willful contravention,
the penalties could be as high as rupees twenty ﬁve lakh with up to one
year in imprisonment. In addition the auditors are required to refund
15Accounting and auditing standards in India are notiﬁed by the Central Government
based on the recommendations of the National Advisory Committee on Accounting
and Auditing Standards. The “Advisory Committee” prepares its recommendations in
consultation with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). In cases, where
accounting standards for certain items are yet to be notiﬁed by the Central Government,
the standards speciﬁed by the ICAI are deemed to be the auditing standards.
17the remuneration received and, more importantly, pay for damages to the
company or to any other persons for loss arising out of incorrect or misleading
statements in the audit report.
2.4 Independent Oversight of the Auditors
The SOX Act has set up the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) “To oversee the audit of listed companies in order to protect
investors’ and public interest in matters relating to the preparation of audited
ﬁnancial statements.”16 The SOX Act empowers the PCAOB to register all
audit ﬁrms, establish auditing rules, conduct periodic inspection of audit
ﬁrms, carry out investigation and disciplinary proceedings against errant
ﬁrms and ensure compliance with all the accounting and auditing rules
speciﬁed under the SOX Act and the SEC rules.
The NCC reviewed the necessity of establishing a Public Oversight Board in
line with the PCAOB, but ultimately did not recommend its establishment
largely keeping in view that its establishment requires the consolidation of
powers which are now distributed among the various regulatory authorities
like the Department of Company Aﬀairs (DCA), the SEBI, the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) and the like into a single regulatory body which is
impractical. Instead, the NCC provided for the establishment of independent
Quality Review Boards (QRBs), “to periodically examine and review the
quality of audit, secretarial and cost accounting ﬁrms, and pass judgement
and comments on the quality and suﬃciency of systems, infrastructure and
practices.” The main objective behind the recommendations was to speed
up the investigation and adjudication process, of complaints received against
errant member ﬁrms, while keeping the process out of conﬂict with the
provisions of the existing Acts. To this extent, the committee detailed out
an elaborate institutional structure consisting of a “Prosecution Directorate”,
“Disciplinary Committee” and an appellate body which were responsible for
timely disposal resolution of the various stages of a disciplinary process. It
is hoped that the QRBs will further strengthen the integrity of the ﬁnancial




The audit committee plays a vital role ensuring the independence of the
audit process. Auditing the operations of modern corporations is a complex
process requiring understanding of the rules and judgements made by the
management in preparing the ﬁnancial statements. For veriﬁcation of these
ﬁnancial statements, the auditor requires access to all necessary documents
and a truthful explanation of all procedures. It is unlikely that this can be
expected from the inside management whose very actions is the subject of the
auditing process. Even if management is truthful, there is a need to insulate
the veriﬁcation process from the inﬂuence of the inside management so that
outsiders perceive the audit process as independent as they cannot directly
observe the managers truthfulness. If auditors are hired by the management
and they decide the scope of auditing services and auditor’s compensation,
the audit process is unlikely to be perceived as independent.
The audit committee has been formed to act both as a conduit of information
supplied by the management to the auditors, and at the same time to insulate
the auditor from the pulls and pressures of the management. The audit
committee is therefore required to be “independent” of the management and
has the responsibility of deciding the scope or work, including the ﬁxation of
audit fees and determination of the extent of non-audit services. The basic
idea is to make the auditor not to be dependent on inside management, both
in it terms of discharge of its functions as well as in terms of its survival.
3.1 Size and composition of the audit committee
There is a concerted move across all countries to require listed companies
to have an audit committee of a minimum size, to ensure that members are
ﬁnancially literate and to make them independent of the management (see
Box 3.1 and 3.1). In India, the constitution of audit committees is now
mandatory for listed companies both under the Companies Bill (2009) as
well as under Clause 4917 of the SEBI Act. Section 158 of the Companies
Bill (2009) requires all listed companies to have an audit committee with a
minimum of three directors with independent directors forming a majority
and at least one director having knowledge of ﬁnancial management, audit
or accounts. The chairman of the audit committee has to be an independent
17Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Clause 49 Regulations, Circular No.
SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2004/12/10 October 29, 2004. http://www.sebi.gov.in
19Box 2: Cross-country comparison of regulations governing audit
committees: OECD
NYSE Listing Standards, 2004 (USA): Listed companies must have an Audit
Committee. The audit committee must have a minimum of three members. All
members of the audit committee must satisfy the requirements for independence. Each
member of the audit committee must be ﬁnancially literate, and at least one member of
the audit committee must have accounting or related ﬁnancial management expertise.
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 2007 ASX
Corporate Governance Council: The board should establish an audit committee.
The audit committee should be structured so that it consists only of non-executive
directors; consists of a majority of independent directors; is chaired by an independent
chair, who is not chair of the board; has at least three members. The audit committee
should be of suﬃcient size, independence and technical expertise to discharge its
mandate eﬀectively.
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 2003 (UK): The board should
establish an audit committee of at least three members (or in the case of smaller
companies two) who should all be independent non-executive directors. The board
should satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit committee has recent and
relevant ﬁnancial experience.
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004 When committees of the
board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be
well deﬁned and disclosed by the board. In order to evaluate the merits of board
committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and clear picture
of their purpose, duties and composition.
director. The company is required to disclose the composition of the audit
committee in its Director’s Report.
Under Clause 49, all listed companies are required to have an audit committee
of at least three directors of which two thirds should be independent. Clause
49 also requires the audit committee to meet at least four times a year with
the gap between two successive meeting not exceeding four months. This
regulation tries to ensure the quality of audit committee by requiring that
all audit committee members to be “ﬁnancially literate” with at least one
member having “accounting or related ﬁnancial management expertise.”
The regulations regarding size, composition, and expertise under Clause 49
mirrors the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) regulations in many respects,
20Box 3: Cross-country comparison of regulations governing audit
committees: Emerging markets
Clause 49 of stock exchange Listing Agreement, 2004, SEBI (India): All
listed companies should have a Audit Committee. The audit committee shall have
minimum three directors as members. Two-thirds of the members of audit committee
shall be independent directors. All members of audit committee shall be ﬁnancially
literate and at least one member shall have accounting or related ﬁnancial management
expertise. The Chairman of the Audit Committee shall be an independent director.
Guidelines of Code of Best Practice of CG, 2003, IBGC (Brazil) The Audit
Committee should preferably be made up of independent members of the Board
of Directors. Directors also serving as Oﬃcers should not take part in the Audit
Committee. The Board of Directors should provide a formal description of the
qualiﬁcations, eﬀorts, and time commitment expected from the Audit Committee. The
Committee should set up its own Internal Regulation and consist of at least three
members, all of whom familiar with basic ﬁnancial and accounting matters. At least
one member should be more experienced in accounting issues, audits, and ﬁnancial
management.
Code on Corporate Governance Practices, Main Board Listing Rules, 2005,
HKEx, (Hong Kong): Every listed issuer must establish an audit committee
comprising non-executive directors only. The audit committee must comprise a
minimum of three members, at least one of whom is an independent non-executive
director with appropriate professional qualiﬁcations or accounting or related ﬁnancial
management expertise as required under rule 3.10(2). The majority of the audit
committee members must be independent non-executive directors of the listed issuer.
The audit committee must be chaired by an independent non-executive director.
Code of Corporate Governance, 2005, (Singapore): The Board should set up
an Audit Committee (AC). The AC should comprise at least three directors, all non-
executive, the majority of whom, including the Chairman, should be independent.
The Board should ensure that the members of the AC are appropriately qualiﬁed to
discharge their responsibilities. At least two members should have accounting or related
ﬁnancial management expertise or experience, as the Board interprets such qualiﬁcation
in its business judgement.
but there are two important diﬀerences. Like Clause 49, Section 303A.0718 of
the NYSE regulations also require the audit committee to be have a minimum
of three members, but under the NYSE regulations the audit committee
is to be constituted entirely of independent directors unlike the two-thirds
rule under Clause 49. Second, the NYSE regulation actively discourages
18NYSE Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/
lcm/
21audit committee members to serve in more than three audit committees and
require that the company make an aﬃrmative determination of the ability of
an audit committee member to eﬀectively discharge his/her responsibilities
in case he/she serves in more than three audit committees. The company is
required to disclose the basis of such determination in the company’s proxy
statement or annual report. No such aﬃrmative determination is required
under Clause 49.
The NCC committee expressly pointed to the considerable amount of
additional time that an Audit Committee requires “to successfully discharge
its obligations in letter and in spirit.” This observation acquires special
signiﬁcance due to the high incidence of multiple directorships in India
(Sarkar and Sarkar, 2009) and the fact that many companies belonging
to business groups have multiple subsidiaries which demand signiﬁcant
amount of time by audit committee members to oversee the preparation
of consolidated accounts. Section 146 of the Companies Bill (2009) does
limit the number of directorships to ﬁfteen. Clause 49 restricts the number
of committee memberships to ten and the number of Chairmanship to ﬁve
that directors can have in public limited companies. However, no separate
restrictions exist for directors serving on audit committees. Indeed even the
above restrictions are considered to be liberal to allow the directors to fully
discharge their functions and responsibilities.
Another area which needs tightening in Clause 49 is the deﬁnition of
“ﬁnancially literate” and the conditions under which a member will be
considered to have “accounting or related ﬁnancial management expertise.”
Currently, these are too broad and open ended. As the NCC points out,
while “While one member of the committee may be positioned as the
one having “ﬁnancial and accounting knowledge”, it is worth asking how
deep that knowledge is, especially given the new accounting standards and
complexities”. To be fair, the NYSE regulations which also have exactly
the same requirements, does not even deﬁne these terms but instead gives
the board the ultimate power to determine if in its business judgement,
the qualiﬁcation of a person is satisfactory enough to induct him/her as
an audit committee member. A much tighter deﬁnition of ﬁnancial expertise
comes from the “SK Regulations” (See Box 3.1) in the United States which
requires all companies ﬁling ﬁnancial statements with the SEC to declare if
their audit committees contain an “audit committee ﬁnancial expert”. The
regulations specify four attributes which a person must possess to qualify as
an “audit committee ﬁnancial expert” and list four alternative ways in which
22Box 4: Deﬁnition of “audit committee ﬁnancial expert” under
S-K Regulations
SEC rules: Item 401 of Regulations S-K deﬁne an “audit committee ﬁnancial
expert” as a person who has the following attributes:
1. An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and ﬁnancial
statements.
2. The ability to assess the general application of such principles in connection with
the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves.
3. Experience preparing, auditing, analysing or evaluating ﬁnancial statements that
present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting issues that are generally
comparable to the breadth and complexity of issues that can reasonably be
expected to be raised by the registrant’s ﬁnancial statements, or experience
actively supervising one or more persons engaged in such activities.
4. An understanding of internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting.
5. An understanding of audit committee functions.
Further, a person shall have acquired such attributes through:
1. Education and experience as a principal ﬁnancial oﬃcer, principal accounting
oﬃcer, controller, public accountant or auditor or experience in one or more
positions that involve the performance of similar functions.
2. Experience actively supervising a principal ﬁnancial oﬃcer, principal accounting
oﬃcer, controller, public accountant, auditor or person performing similar
functions.
3. Experience overseeing or assessing the performance of companies or public
accountants with respect to the preparation, auditing or evaluation of ﬁnancial
statements; or
4. Other relevant experience.
these attributes must have been acquired by such a person.19 The Clause
49 regulations, moving a step forward from the NYSE regulations, make
an attempt to put some guidelines for deﬁning what qualiﬁes a member as
having “accounting or related ﬁnancial management expertise” but these are
well short of the S-K deﬁnition.
19http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm
233.2 Role and power of the audit committee
In addition to the size, composition and the expertise of the audit committee
members, Clause 49 specify detailed guidelines regarding the role and powers
of the audit committee. These regulations are mirrored in Section 158 of the
Companies Bill (2009). Under Clause 49, the role of the audit committee
is to provide oversight of the company’s ﬁnancial reporting process and
ensure the credibility, correctness and the suﬃciency of the disclosure that
are required under the Companies Act of 1956, and the various stipulations
speciﬁed by SEBI. The audit committee is also responsible for recommending
to the Board regarding the appointment, re-appointment, and if required,
the removal of the statutory auditor, and ﬁxing the audit fees. The audit
committee also has the responsibility of approving all non-audit activities
of the statutory auditors and the ﬁxation of the non-audit fees. The audit
committee is required to review with the management the annual ﬁnancial
statements before submission to the Board for approval especially with
respect to changes in accounting policies, audit qualiﬁcations, signiﬁcant
adjustments arising out of auditor ﬁndings, major accounting entries based
on judgements made by management, disclosure of related party transactions
and audit qualiﬁcations. Clause 49 also gives powers to the audit committee
to investigate into any matter that is included in its terms of reference,
seek any information from any employee, and to obtain external legal or
professional advice that it considers necessary.
As i g n i ﬁ c a n tn u m b e ro fp r o a c t i v er e g u l a t i o n sh a v eb e e ne n a c t e di nI n d i a
since the 1990s. For ﬁrst time the Companies Amendment Bill of 2000 made
the formation of audit committees mandatory for all companies with paid
up capital of Rs. 5 crores. Clause 49 that was ﬁrst notiﬁed in February
2000, reiterated this requirement for all listed companies. It required the
formation of audit committee and speciﬁed its roles and functions. The
amended version of Clause 49 that was notiﬁed in October 2004 detailed out
the role, power and functions of the audit committee. The Companies Bill
(2009) has also listed down the power and functions of the audit committee
which were not speciﬁed under the Companies Act of 1956. But two aspects
that require further attention are the composition of the audit committee and
its authority to implement its decisions. These two aspects together aﬀect
the independence of the audit committee and its eﬀectiveness in ensuring the
integrity of the ﬁnancial reporting process.
243.3 Dilution of audit committee independence
Ar e v i e wo ft h es e q u e n c eo fr e g u l a t i o n ss h o w st h a tt h e r eh a sb e e nas t e a d y
dilution of the impendence requirement with respect to the audit committee.
The original Clause 49 regulations required the audit committee to have
am i n i m u ms i z eo ft h r e ea n dt ob eec o n s t i t u t e de n t i r e l yo fn o n - e x e c u t i v e
directors with majority of them being independent.20 The revised Clause 4921
removed the non-executive director requirement and instead speciﬁed that
the audit committee to have a minimum of three members with two-thirds of
them being independent. Given the speciﬁcation of a minimum size of three,
the move from the majority to the two-thirds rule did not impose any extra
independence burden.22 The only eﬀect of the revised Clause 49 regulations
was that management directors could now be part of the audit committee.
The Companies Bill, 2009 follows the revised Clause 49 regulations by not
insisting that the audit committee comprise only of non executive directors
but reverts to the majority rule form the two-thirds rule.23
If the idea of allowing management presence in the audit committee is to
get management input into the ﬁnancial reporting process, then the same
be easily obtained as elsewhere Clause 49 speciﬁcally empowers the audit
committee can invite any of the executives, as it considers appropriate to be
present at the meetings of the audit committee. The overwhelming objective
of the regulations with respect to the audit committee should be to ensure
that the audit committee is truly independent of the management. Seeking
management input should be a discretionary choice of the committee and
not mandated by law.
The NCC in its report, while applauding the existing Clause 49 regulations
on the audit committee, pointed out that one area that needed improvement
and tightening was the composition of the audit committee and recommended
that if the audit committee is perceived to be independent, then it should
20Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Clause 49 Regulations, Circular No.
SMDRP/POLICY/CIR-10/2000, dated February 21, 2000. http://www.sebi.gov.in
21Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Clause 49 Regulations, Circular No.
SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2004/12/10 October 29, 2004. http://www.sebi.gov.in
22For an audit committee size of 3, 4 and 6 the two requirements are eﬀectively the
same. For size 5 only the modiﬁed would require 4 independent directors as opposed to 3
under the previous regulations. For audit committees of size seven or more, the modiﬁed
regulations would require more independent directors, but very few companies have audit
committees with more than seven or more members.
23Section 158 (2) of the Companies Bill, 2009 speciﬁes that “The Audit Committee shall
consist of a minimum of three directors with independent directors forming a majority and
at least one director having knowledge of ﬁnancial management, audit or accounts.”
25consist only of independent directors. Unfortunately this has not been
incorporated in the Companies Bill (2009). In a situation where regulations
all over the world are trying hard to increase investor conﬁdence in the
ﬁnancial reporting process by envisaging an audit committee that is perceived
as a body independent of the management (Boxes 3.1 and 3.1), regulations
in India seem to be falling behind.
The lower independence requirement regarding the composition of the audit
committee has to be seen in context of the fact that the audit committee’s
recommendations relating to hiring, oversight, compensation, and ﬁring of
the outside auditor are not binding on the Board. While Clause 49 is silent
on this matter, Section 158 (9) of the Companies Bill (2009) (and currently
under Section 292-A of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2000) states if the
Board does not accept the recommendations of the audit committee, reasons
therefore should be communicated to shareholders.24 This is quite in contrast
to the regulation in the US where under the SOX Act of 2002, implemented
by SEC under Rule 10A-3, the audit committee is “directly responsible for
the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight” of the statutory
auditor and each such statutory auditor “must report directly to the audit
committee.”
The power of the Board to overrule the decision or recommendations of
the audit committee has to be also seen in context of the current Clause
49 regulations governing Board independence. Clause 49 allows the Board
to have only one-third independent directors in case of a non-executive
Chairman. Allowing the Board to overrule the recommendations of the
audit committee brings in the possibility of management overrule as the
Board will be dominated by insiders in this case. Even in the case of a
board with an Executive Chairman, where Clause 49 regulations require
independent directors to consist of at least ﬁfty percent, the strength of
the inside directors is evenly poised with that of the independent directors
24Recommendation 4.7(11) of the Sanjeev Reddy Report on Corporate Excellence (2000)
commissioned the Department of Company Aﬀairs which forms the basis of the 2000
Amendment states that the audit committee being the creature of the Board “should be
subordinate to the authority of the Board. The Board should have the authority to override
any decisions of the Committee. In the interests of the professionalism and transparency,
where the Board disagrees with any material decision of the Audit Committee, there
should be a disclosure requirement in the annual reports to set out any such instances
together with the reasoning of the Board for such decisions.” Similar recommendations
are found in the J.J Irani Committee Report on Company Law which forms the basis of the
Companies Bill (2009) which states that “The recommendation of the Audit Committee
if overruled by the Board, should be disclosed in the Directors’ Report with the reasons
for overruling.”
26and possibly tilted towards the management as the Chairman is an insider.
Under the Companies Bill (2009), this problem will be further aggravated
as the proposed regulation with respect to board composition require
companies to have only a minimum of one-third of the board to consist of
independent directors and does not make any distinction between companies
with executive and non-executive status of the Chairman.25
Ensuring the integrity of the ﬁnancial reporting process by providing
independent oversight by the audit committee is paramount for governance.
The SOX regulations try to ensure this by requiring the audit committee
to consist entirely of independent directors and giving it the sole authority
to discharging all audit-related functions. The SOX Act has no role for
independent directors apart from serving in the audit committee. The NYSE
listing regulation provide for a majority independent Board to oversee the
overall running of the company. Together they provide an environment for
more independent reporting of the numbers. In India in contrast, the audit
committee is much more subject to the inﬂuence of the management. The
power of the Board to overrule the recommendations of the audit committee
and the current regulations governing Board composition makes the audit
committee in India less powerful and more subjected to the inﬂuence of the
management than it is in the US.
While Clause 49 has details speciﬁcations regarding the powers, role and
review of the audit committee, it does not formally require the preparation
of an audit committee report as required under the SEC regulation. The
Quarterly Compliance Report stipulated under Clause 49 only require the
company to report the compliance status (reported as “yes” or “no”) with
respect to the various aspects of audit committee functioning which amounts
to tick box regulation. The suggested items for inclusion in the Annual
Corporate Governance Report with respect to audit committees only require
the company to give a brief description of the terms of reference, composition,
including name of members and chairperson, along with meetings and
attendance of the audit committee during the year.
The NCC recommended that the role and functions of the audit committee
be laid down in an Audit Committee Charter and recommended that the
chairman certify whether the audit committee discharged all the functions
listed in an audit committee charter which would form the Action Taken
Report to shareholders (ATR). The NCC further recommended that the
statement should also certify whether the audit committee met with the
statutory and internal auditors, without the presence of management, and
25Section 132(3) of the Companies Bill (2009).
27whether such meetings revealed materially signiﬁcant issues of risks. The
NYSE regulations are clear is specifying that for the audit committee “to
perform its oversight functions most eﬀectively, it must have the beneﬁt
of separate sessions with the management, the independent auditors and
those responsible for the internal audit function.” Currently, Clause 49
regulations do not speciﬁcally require the audit committee to meet separately
the external auditor and the internal auditor, and without the management
to get an independent assessment of the internal audit procedure. Similar
requirements are also not included in the Companies Bill (2009).
The general tone of the SEC regulation is that the audit committee is a body
that is independent of the management and works closely with the external
auditor to ensure that the management justiﬁes all critical accounting policies
and practices that it uses in preparing the ﬁnancial statements. The NYSE
rules speciﬁcally state that one of the duties and responsibilities of the audit
committee is to “review with the independent audit any audit problems or
diﬃculties and management’s response.”
In contrast, under Clause 49, the audit committee reviews “with the
management” the ﬁnancial reporting process and evaluates the performance
of the internal and external auditors which gives the notion of a teamwork of
which the management, the internal auditors, the audit committee and the
external auditors are equal partners. This probably reﬂects the philosophy
of “self governance” and the often made assertion that “compliance should
come from within”. Only time will tell which approach is more justiﬁed.
4 Eﬀectiveness of audit committees and
auditor independence: empirical evidence
Audit committee and auditor independence have been important areas of
research in the accounting literature. Studies on audit committees have
focused on the independence, activity, and on the ﬁnancial expertise of the
audit committee members. Research on auditor independence have focused
on the extent of non-audit services provided by the external auditor as well
audit ﬁrm tenure, both of which are generally seen as hindrances to auditor
independence. Renewed interest on these topics have emerged in light of
the new regulations that were enacted in the wake of the major corporate
scandals in the US, particularly the collapse of WorldCom and Enron and
the consequent enactment of the SOX regulations. The SOX regulations have
28been a reference point of similar reforms initiated in many other countries
relating to audit committees and auditor independence. The SOX regulations
emphasize not only the independence but also the ﬁnancial expertise of the
audit committees. Similarly the SOX regulation and the recent provisions of
the new Companies Bill 2009 in India prohibit a number of non-audit services
which are conceived to be a hindrance to auditor independence.
The extant literature provides strong empirical support that both
independent audit committees and higher levels of audit independence have
as i g n i ﬁ c a n tb e n e ﬁ c i a le ﬀ e c to ne n h a n c i n gt h eq u a l i t yo fd i s c l o s u r e s ,i n
reducing discretionary earnings management, increasing the informativeness
of earnings, and in general enhancing the value of the ﬁrm.
4.1 Studies on audit committees and earnings
management
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in ﬁnancial
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter ﬁnancial reports to either
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of
a company or inﬂuence contractual outcomes that depend on reported
accounting numbers (Healey and Wahlen, 1999).
An u m b e ro fe m p i r i c a ls t u d i e sh a v el o o k e da tt h er e l a t i o nb e t w e e na u d i t
committee independence and earnings management. The study by (Klein,
2002) which analyses the relation between audit committee and board
characteristics and earnings management using a two year sample of 500
S&P ﬁrms, ﬁnds that independent audit committees signiﬁcantly reduced
abnormal accruals as did an independent boards. Reductions in audit
committee independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal
accruals. The eﬀect is most pronounced when the board or the resultant
audit committee is comprised of a minority of outside directors i.e., when
audit committee changes from majority to minority of independent directors.
Carcello et al. (2002) used a sample of 100 Fortune-500 companies to examine
if a more independent audit committee tries to protect its reputation by
insisting on diﬀerentially higher audit quality. The authors hypothesize that
this should lead to the demand for higher audit eﬀort and consequently
to the hiring of high quality auditors. Consistent with this conjecture,
the study ﬁnds a positive relation between audit fees and audit committee
independence, diligence, and expertise.
29Abbott et al. (2003) addresses issues relating to auditor-client independence
using a sample of 538 companies for the year 2001. Rendering of certain
types of non-audit services is perceived by regulators as hampering auditor
independence. Independent audit committees may have incentives to limit
non-audit services and accordingly, non-audit fees, to enhance auditor-
independence in either appearance or fact. The study ﬁnds that active and
independent audit committees, consisting of fully independent directors and
meeting at least four times a year, are associated with signiﬁcantly lower non-
audit fee ratio. The evidence is consistent with the general perception that
high level of non-audit fees could act as a hindrance to auditor independence.
Many studies examine whether the ﬁnancial expertise of the audit committee
matters in increasing the quality of accounting disclosures. For example,
Yeh and Woidtke (2007) examine the eﬀect of concentrated ownership,
independence of the audit committee and the presence of ﬁnancial expertise
on earnings informativeness. Earnings informativeness measures how stock
market returns respond to changes in measures of accounting performance.
The study is based on a sample of 450 observations consisting of the largest
150 companies each from three East Asian countries namely, Singapore, Hong
Kong and Malaysia. The study ﬁnds that concentrated ownership reduces
earnings informativeness. However, independent audit committees enhance
earnings informativeness only if there are independent directors in the audit
committee with ﬁnancial expertise. In addition, the positive beneﬁts of
having an independent audit committee along with directors having ﬁnancial
expertise more than oﬀset the detrimental eﬀect that is associated with
concentrated ownership.
Similarly, Xie et al. (2003) using a sample of 110 ﬁrms from the S&P 500 for
three years, 1992, 1994, and 1996, show that audit committees with members
having corporate or ﬁnancial backgrounds are associated with lower earnings
management. Similar results are found for frequency of meetings by the
audit committee. The study shows that it is not independence per se but
the quality and activity of the audit committee which is important.
4.2 Studies on auditor independence and earnings
management
Auditor independence has been another area of intensive research in the
accounting literature. Auditor independence has been generally proxied by
the ratio of non-audit to audit fees under the assumption that a relatively
30higher non-audit fee makes the auditor more dependent on the company
for its economic survival and hinder and comprise its ability to fully and
faithfully discharge its audit related functions. Accordingly, studies in
this genre have looked at the eﬀect auditor independence on earnings
management, earnings informativeness, and other measures of earnings
quality.
Frankel et al. (2002) examine whether auditor fees are associated with
earnings management and how the market reacts to the disclosure of auditor
fees. Using data collected from proxy statements, they ﬁnd that non-audit
fees are positively associated with small earnings surprises and the magnitude
of discretionary accruals, while audit fees are negatively associated with these
earnings management indicators. They also ﬁnd evidence that share values of
ﬁrms which reported higher ratios of non-audit fees too audit fees were lower
on the date the fees were disclosed, although the eﬀect is small in economic
terms.
In related work, Srinidhi and Gul (2007) explore the relation between non-
audit fees and accrual quality to analyse if in settings where audit quality
is compromised by a loss of auditor independence, managers used accruals
more opportunistically and thereby drive down the accrual quality. They
also examined if higher audit eﬀort and quality as which are proxied by
higher audit fees translate into better accrual quality. Their results show that
accrual quality has a signiﬁcant negative association with the magnitude of
non-audit fees and a signiﬁcant positive association with audit fees. However,
not all studies tend to ﬁnd evidence that non-audit fees are associated with
biased ﬁnancial reporting (Huang et al.,2 0 0 7 ) .
It is diﬃcult to compare ﬁndings of studies from diﬀerent countries as the
ratio of non-audit to audit fees is only a proxy of auditor independence which
can also depend signiﬁcantly on the institutional and legal framework of
the respective countries, and in particular on its accounting standards and
punitive actions in case of accounting violations.
4.3 Studies on auditor rotation and earnings manage-
ment
The issue of audit independence and audit ﬁrm rotation has been highly
debated in the accounting literature. As mentioned earlier, the debate
highlights two opposing perspectives with the proponents emphasizing the
need to have a “fresh look” at periodic intervals to ensure client-auditor
31independence and auditor eﬃciency while the opponents highlighting the
risk of lower audit quality and higher audit failures that can occur due to
the loss in continuity and audit competence created by mandatory audit
ﬁrm rotation (Hoyle, 1978). Academic studies till date have not been able
to produce conclusive proofs about the beneﬁts of audit ﬁrm rotation while
there are good evidences of the risks.
For example, Myers et al. (2003) ﬁnd that earnings quality is actually lower
in ﬁrms with shorter audit tenure. They interpret their results as suggesting
that longer auditor tenure results in auditors placing greater constraints
on management decisions in the reporting of ﬁnancial performance. Other
research indicate that a greater proportion of audit failures occur with
newly acquired clients (Berton, 2007; Petty and Cuganesan, 2006) and that
auditors’ litigation risk is higher in the initial years of audit engagement
(Palmrose, 2006).
One problem with these empirical studies is that they cannot test if rotating
auditors will enhance audit quality as very few companies have in practice
rotated auditors since the law does not require then to do so. Most of the
empirical ﬁndings cited above use length of audit tenure in their analysis
and then extrapolate their ﬁndings to the case of zero tenure i.e., auditor
rotation. However, this may not be the correct approach as auditor rotation
is a discrete event and may not be predictable from these models which treat
tenure as continuous.
Notwithstanding the ﬁndings of the empirical studies, theoretical arguments
imply that there ought to be term limits for auditors or at least the audit
engagement team. Surely, longer tenure is better in that the understanding
of auditor of the internal workings of the companies increase with it. But
longer the tenure, higher is the risk of management inﬂuence on the auditor.
Thus there ought to be some point where rotating auditors or audit partners
would result in higher net beneﬁts.
5 Trends in audit committee and auditor
characteristics in India
This section presents trends in characteristic of audit committees, their size,
composition, and activity as well as extent of non-audit services provided by
auditors in Indian companies.
32These trends are presented for the period 2005 to 2008 based on a balanced
panel of the top 500 listed companies26 in India terms of market capitalization
as on March 31st, 2008. Table 1 presents trends in audit committee size.
This table and all subsequent ones are constructed based on the disclosures
made in the corporate governance reports ﬁled by the companies. The year
2006 marks the year when all listed ﬁrms were required to comply with the
revised provisions of Clause 49 which were ﬁrst notiﬁed on October 29, 2004
but came into eﬀect from January 1, 2006.
Table 1 Distribution of ﬁrms according to size of audit committees
Size 2005 2006 2007 2008
2 0.30 2.19 0.51 1.25
3 57.19 50.27 51.39 49.87
4 29.64 33.61 34.43 36.84
5 7.78 9.02 9.87 8.02
6 2.99 3.83 3.04 3.26
7 2.10 0.55 0.51 0.50
8 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.25
9 0.00 0.27 0.25 0.00
Average 3.62 3.66 3.66 3.62
No. of ﬁrms 334 366 395 399
Source: Annual Reports of Companies, SANSCO
Judged in the context of Clause 49 regulations requiring listed companies to
have audit committees with a minimum of three members, Table 1 shows
that nearly all companies have complied with the regulation.
Am a j o r i t yo ft h ec o m p a n i e s ,h o w e v e rh a v ec o n s t i t u t e dt h e i ra u d i t
committees with the minimum size required under the regulations, with
one third of the companies adding one extra member. There are very few
companies that have audit committees with more than ﬁve members. Tables
2a n d3s h o wt h et r e n d si na u d i tc o m m i t t e ei n d e p e n d e n c e .
Recalling that Clause 49 requires all audit committees to have at least 2 to
3 of its members as independent directors, Table 2 shows that the mean of
independent directors to be around 80 in these four years. Notwithstanding
this observation, about 15 percent of the companies did not comply with
the regulations in 2006. However, companies seem to be making an eﬀort to
comply with the regulations with the extent of non-compliance decreasing to
just over 10 percent by 2008.
26Financial ﬁrms are excluded from the analysis.
33Table 2 Trends in audit committee independence: Distribution of companies
Fraction of Year
Ind. Directors 2005 2006 2007 2008
f<2/3 8.16 15.32 12.76 10.35
2/3 ≤ f<3/4 18.43 18.11 22.45 23.48
3/4 ≤ f<1 18.43 22.84 25.51 28.28
f =1 54.98 43.73 39.29 37.88
Companies (number) 334 366 395 399
Fraction of Ind. Directors 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.79
Fraction with Managing Director
in the audit committee (%) 19.51 19.70 19.90 22.47
Source: Annual Reports of Companies, SANSCO
As t r i k i n go b s e r v a t i o nw i t hr e g a r dt oa u d i tc o m m i t t e ei n d e p e n d e n c ei st h e
steady decline in the percentage of companies with fully independent audit
committees. While in 2005 more than half of the companies had voluntarily
chosen to have a fully independent audit committee, this percentage has
steadily declined to just over one-third by 2008. What is instead observed is
a very steady move to have audit committees which are just in accordance
with the minimum independence requirement that is prescribed under the
law.27
This is further borne out by the steady increase in the proportion of
companies that have an executive (management) director present in audit
committees from 2006 to 2008. Recall that until 2006, when the revised
Clause 49 same into eﬀect, the audit committee was required to consist only of
non-executive directors. The revised Clause permitted executive directors to
be part of the audit committee and what we observe since then is a change in
audit committee composition that seems to be a direct response to the change
in regulation. The steady decline in fully independent audit committees is
also consistent with this change in regulation as non-executive directors are
more likely to be also independent directors.28
The trends in independence presented in Table 3 for diﬀerent sizes of audit
committees conﬁrm that the decline in fully independent audit committees
is true for of all sizes though the decline is more pronounced for audit
27Given the size distribution of audit committees in Table 1, a fraction between 2/3 but
less than 1 implies a mandatory compliance under the Clause 49 regulations.
28Non-executive directors could be independent directors or gray directors. Gray
directors are those who are related to the executive directors or have a ﬁnancial interest in
the company. Companies belonging to business groups often have family members serving
as gray directors on company boards.
34Table 3 Trends in audit committee independence: Distribution of companies
The following tables describe the fraction of independent directors on the audit committees
of companies in India as a measure of audit committee independence, and how this has
changed in the period from 2005-2009 for Indian companies. This is shown for companies
with diﬀerent sizes of audit companies, where the size = 3,4,5,6.
Fraction of Size=3 Size=4
Independent Directors 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
f<2/3 7.41 7.73 8.50 6.53 6.06 15.97 10.29 9.72
2/3 ≤ f<3/4 28.04 32.04 39.50 42.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3/4 ≤ f<1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.48 52.10 61.76 62.50
f =1 64.55 60.22 52.00 51.26 45.45 31.93 27.94 27.78
No. of Firms 189 181 200 199 99 119 136 144
Size=5 Size=6
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
f<2/3 23.08 30.30 38.46 31.25 11.11 28.57 16.67 15.38
2/3 ≤ f<3/4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 35.71 58.33 61.54
3/4 ≤ f<1 50.00 51.52 38.46 59.38 0.00 21.43 8.33 15.38
f =1 26.92 18.18 23.08 9.38 55.56 14.29 16.67 7.69
No. of ﬁrms 26 33 39 32 9 14 12 13
Source: Annual Reports of Companies, SANSCO
committees which are bigger in size. The bigger audit committees also have
higher non-compliance with the Clause 49 requirements. For example, in
2008, almost one third of the audit committees with size 5 did not have the
requisite number of independent directors required under Clause 49.
Table 4 presents the distribution of companies according to the number of
meetings held. Clause 49 requires the audit committee to have at least 4
meetings per year with not more than four months of gap between two
successive meetings. It can be observed that there is steady improvement
in compliance with only about 5 percent of the companies holding less than
four meetings in 2008. The mean number of meetings held is nearly ﬁve in
the last two years. It appears that many companies are holding meetings as
per their individual requirements and were not simply following the dictates
of the law.
However, an important issue with respect to meetings is the duration of
the audit committee meetings and the preparation time that is given to the
audit committee members to have meaningful discussions about the ﬁnancial
operation of the companies. FICCI and Thornton (2009) conducted a a
35Table 4 Meetings Held by Audit Committees - Distribution of Companies
No. of Meetings Held Year
2005 2006 2007 2008
0 0.93 0.56 1.03 0.50
1 0.62 3.36 1.28 0.25
2 2.17 1.96 1.28 1.01
3 11.46 6.16 3.59 4.52
4 39.94 43.14 44.10 45.23
5 24.46 23.81 25.13 26.88
6 9.91 11.48 12.31 11.31
7 10.53 9.52 11.28 10.30
Avg. meetings held 4.67 4.62 4.83 4.82
Companies (number) 323 357 390 398
Source: Annual Reports of Companies, SANSCO
corporate governance review of 500 mid-sized companies which show that, in
50 percent of the companies, audit committee meetings lasted for less than
two hours while in only 9 percent of the companies did the meetings went
beyond four hours. Similarly, the majority of the companies gave an average
preparation time of up to seven days to the audit committee members in
terms s of mailing them the agenda of the meetings while only 6 percent
gave time of more than two weeks.
Additional characteristics of audit committees for the panel of 500 companies
are presented in Table 5 for the year 2008, which presents key measures
of audit committee quality that have been the focus of reform initiatives.
Among these are (i) the presence of members with accounting degree (ii)
the number of directorships held by independent directors (iii) the tenure
of the independent directors and (iv) the mean age of independent directors
serving on the audit committee. While audit committee independence is
paramount for ensuring the integrity of the ﬁnancial reporting process, there
is a growing recognition that what is perhaps more important is the ﬁnancial
literacy and commitment of the audit committee members to discharge the
various functions entrusted to them by the law. While Clause 49 does not
require audit committee members to possess accounting degrees, it can be
hardly imagined that a audit committee will be able to do justice to its role
without any of its members having a formal training on the complexity of
the accounting process and the various accounting and auditing standards
that confront today’s corporations.
Table 5 shows that about two thirds of the companies had an audit committee
36Table 5 Audit Committee Characteristics (Sample Means) - 2008
Size of Audit Committee (Nos.) 3.65
Size of Board (Nos.) 8.92
Audit Committee has a member with
an accounting degree (%) 63.00
Board has a member with an
accounting degree (%) 95.00
Number of Audit Committee members with
an accounting degree (Nos.) 1.35
Number of Board members with
accounting degree (Nos.) 2.78
Percentage of Audit Committee members
with an accounting degree (%) 40.13
Percentage of Board members with an
accounting degree (%) 31.82
Total number of directorships of independent directors
serving in the Audit Committee (Nos.) 2.61
Median tenure of independent directors serving
in the Audit Committee (Yrs.) 6.53
Median age of independent directors serving in
the Audit Committee (Yrs.) 58.29
Source: Annual Reports of Companies, SANSCO
Directors Database: A Corporate Governance Initiative of Bombay Stock Exchange
prepared in association with Prime Database. http://www.directorsdatabase.
com/
with at least one member with an accounting degree. However, where
the audit committee did not have a member with accounting knowledge
it was very likely the Board had one such a member. On an average,
forty percent of the audit committee members had an accounting degree.
Another fundamental condition which need to be fulﬁlled by audit committee
members is their ability to devote suﬃcient time to eﬀectively discharge the
all the functions assigned to them by law. As we have seen that the current
SEC regulations discourage directors with more than three directorships to be
members of the audit committee because over the commitment that comes
with too many directorships might hamper the ability of the directors to
dutifully carry out all the functions expected of him/her. In this context, it
is encouraging to note from Table 5 that the average directorships held by
independent directors to be less than three. This is a welcome development
and will hopefully persist in the coming years.
Moving to issues relating to auditor independence, Table 6 presents some
37Table 6 Non-Audit services and non–audit fees
2006-07 2007-08
Companies where auditors render non-audit services (%) (%)
Indian Business Groups 83.90 85.15
Indian Standalone 75.73 70.54
Foreign Business Groups 84.21 88.24
Foreign Standalone 70.37 62.96
All Companies 80.00 79.40
Non-audit to audit fees by ownership groups (median) (%) (%)
Indian Business Groups 42.00 34.88
Indian Standalone 39.54 26.30
Foreign Business Groups 53.92 56.38
Foreign Standalone 79.42 86.89
All Companies 46.67 35.65
Non-audit to audit fees by size (median) (%) (%)
Small (< 750 crores) 48.33 35.42
Medium (> 750 and < 3400 crores) 41.43 33.50
Large (> 3400 crores) 55.36 44.44
All Companies 46.67 35.65
Source: Annual Reports of Companies, SANSCO
relevant statistics for the same panel of 500 companies, but for the years
2007 and 2008. It can be observed that in eighty percent of the companies,
the statutory auditor was also rendering non-audit services. There is virtually
no change between 2007 and 2008. Comparative ﬁgures available for the US
in 2000, which predates the passage of the SOX ACT, show that out of the
16700 companies which registered with the SEC, only 4100, or 25 percent
purchased non-audit services from the external auditor.
Interesting diﬀerences surface when the aggregate picture is broken down
into ownership groups. Nearly eighty ﬁve percent of companies belonging to
business groups, either domestic or foreign buy non-audit services from the
statutory auditor compared to seventy to seventy ﬁve percent for standalone
ﬁrms. Second, the percentage of group companies buying non-audit services
shows an increase from 2007 to 2008 while standalone companies exhibit a
decline.
Table 6 also presents the extent of non-audit fees relative to audit fees
earned by auditing ﬁrms. Current regulations require that non-audit fees
not to exceed audit-fees. As the data in the table demonstrates, the extent
of non-audit fees in both years was well below the statutory limit. More
encouragingly, the extent of non-audit to audit fees has declined from 46.67
38percent in 2007 to 35.65 in 2008. Decomposition by ownership groups shows
that extent of non-audit fees to be much higher for foreign companies than
for domestic companies. On an average, the ratio of non-audit to audit
fees were around 40 percent in 2007 compared to 53 percent for foreign
group companies and nearly 80 percent for foreign standalone companies.
More strikingly, while domestic companies exhibit a decline in the non-audit
fee percentage, with the decline more pronounced for standalone companies,
foreign companies exhibit an increase, however marginal. Decomposition
with respect to size shows that the extent of non-audit fees to be higher in the
larger bigger companies for both years. However, all companies, irrespective
of size, show a signiﬁcant decline in non-audit fee percentage in 2008.
The above analysis of the empirical trends presents a mixed picture. On the
one hand we observe an increasing trend in compliance. However, at the same
time, we observe a tendency to gravitate to the minimum standards with
respect to audit committee composition. There is little voluntary move to
compose a fully independent audit committee. Instead what we observe is an
increasing trend of inside management to being present in audit committees.
Compared to this, the trends in auditor independence are better. The
data with respect to non-audit services and extent of non-audit fees tend
to suggest that domestic standalone companies, which are also likely to be
relatively smaller in size, are very steadily moving towards the notion of
auditor-company independence envisaged under the regulations. This is a
very welcome development.
6 Conclusions
The theoretical arguments and the empirical literature overwhelmingly
suggest that auditor and audit committee independence plays an important
role in the governance of companies. Currently auditor independence in
India, especially with respect to rendering non-audit services and presence of
conﬂict of interest, is largely dependent on self regulation. The Companies
Act of 1956 has little to oﬀer in this regard. Under the existing regulations
there are many governance issues with respect to auditor and audit committee
independence in India. Among these, the most important ones are that (i) no
regulation bars an auditor from having family or other close relationship with
the audited company or its key management personnel; (ii) no cooling-oﬀ
period for audit partners or staﬀ to join audit clients in a senior management
position or client personnel joining the audit ﬁrm; (iii) auditors can provide
39non-audit services like tax planning, tax representation before tax authorities,
due diligence certiﬁcation, mergers and acquisition; (iv) no mandatory audit
ﬁrm rotation except for government-owned companies, banks, and insurance
companies; and (v) inside management can be present in audit committees.
The recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Committee have plugged many
of these loopholes. The committee’s recommendations especially with respect
to auditor independence are in line with the best international practices. The
Companies Bill (2009) has incorporated many of these recommendations.
For investors to have conﬁdence in the independence of the auditor, the
Companies Bill (2009) needs to be enacted quickly into law.
However, notwithstanding the passage of the Companies Bill (2009), some
issues that have not been incorporated into the Bill will remain as matter
of concern. Most important among these are the independence of the audit
committee both in terms of its composition and the power of the Board
to overrule its decisions, and the issues related to conﬂict-of-interest in
auditor-company relationship and audit partner rotation. These issues have
to be addressed in future regulation to make the auditing and oversight
standards in India comparable to those in the more mature economies. If
it is operationally diﬃcult to do further modiﬁcations to the statutes in
the immediate future, then the respective stock exchanges should explore
the possibility of incorporating these additional standards of independence
in their Listing Agreement. Since the provisions of the Companies Bill
(2009) can be interpreted as only laying down minimum standards nothing
should prevent the stock exchanges from insisting on higher standards of
independence from companies listed under their supervision.
In conclusion, adequate, relevant and high quality disclosures are one of
the most powerful tools available in the hands of independent directors,
shareholders, regulators and outside investors to monitor the performance
of a company. This is particularly important for emerging economies like
India where there is insider dominance. To this extent, measures that
strengthen auditor independence and enhance the powers, functions, and
the independence of the audit committee will be crucial in the governance of
Indian companies. Governance risk is a key determinant of market pricing
of listed securities. A high perceived ’independence quotient’ of a company’s
auditing process can be reassuring to outside shareholders that can help
reduce the risk premium of raising capital thereby providing a strong business
case for strengthening auditor and audit committee independence.
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